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ABSTRACT 
Auditor Changes and Debt Financing: Evidence from China 
by 
CHAN Suet Ying 
Master of Philosophy 
The role of independent auditors is to ensure the accuracy and the credibility 
of the financial statements. Independent auditors help in reducing agency costs 
and serve as a monitoring function for creditors. A change in an auditor–client 
relationship may provide useful information to creditors. Creditors may 
consider the signal of auditor changes, which affects information risks, as a 
factor in determining the terms of debts. After several major audit scandals, 
awareness of the importance of audit quality has increased. Audit partner 
changes and audit firm changes have been implemented in some jurisdictions 
to enhance the audit quality. Since China requires disclosure by signing 
partners’ names on audit reports, audit partner rotations can be identified. The 
direction of audit firm changes can be downward, lateral, and upward audit 
firm changes. In this thesis, the effects on debt financing of auditor changes at 
both audit firm and audit partner levels in different directions are 
comprehensively investigated. This thesis addresses the importance of 
understanding the association between audit firm/ partner changes and debt 
financing. I find that, overall, auditor changes worsen debt financing in various 
situations. The findings of this thesis should have important implications for 
investors, corporate financial managers, and regulators.
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Auditor Changes and Debt Financing: Evidence from China 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Independent auditors play an important role in ascertaining the accuracy and 
reliability of financial statements. A relatively long auditor–client relationship 
involves less financial reporting uncertainty, which may lead to higher-quality 
audits and a lower cost of financing. Conversely, a prolonged auditor tenure 
may compromise auditor independence. If auditor changes induce uncertainty, 
leading to an increase in information risks, creditors may require stricter loan 
terms for companies with auditor changes. This thesis investigates whether 
auditor changes provide useful information to creditors that will affect the 
terms of debt for companies with auditor changes. There are two types of 
auditor changes: voluntary and mandatory. There are also different directions 
of audit firm changes, including upward, lateral, and downward changes. First, 
I examine whether, what, and how changes in auditors affect debt financing. 
Second, I investigate the effect of a change in auditor on debt financing 
without changes in audit quality (i.e. a change in an auditor without a change 
in an audit firm). Third, I examine whether a change in audit firm, without a 
change in auditors, affects debt financing. The last situation is rather unique in 
the Chinese setting, in which the audit partner remains the same, even when 
he/she moves to another audit firm. The emphasis on personal relationships in 
business dealings in Chinese society may explain this arrangement (Kriz and 
Keating 2010). This thesis includes whether there is any impact of such special 
auditor changes on debt financing.  
This thesis is motivated by the importance of audit quality in reducing 
agency problems. The Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audits than 
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non-Big 4 auditors do (DeAngelo 1981). Retaining Big N auditors helps to 
enhance the reliability and credibility of financial statements, which reduces 
monitoring costs (Pittman and Fortin 2004). Lenders perceive companies that 
employ reputed auditors as more trustworthy, resulting in a lower cost of debt 
(Pittman and Fortin 2004). In this thesis, I define audit firm changes from 
non-Big N to Big N and vice versa as upward and downward changes, 
respectively. I define other changes as lateral changes.  
Second, this thesis is motivated by the importance of debt financing in 
China. Debt rose from 160% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 to 
247% in 2015, with bank debt accounting for 19% of GDP in 2015 (Sun 2016). 
Loans granted by banks in China rose from 27.8 trillion yuan in 2007 to 86.79 
trillion yuan in 2014 (The Statistics Portal 2017). The leverage ratio of listed 
non-financial firms in China rose from around 0.47 in 2002 to around 0.60 in 
2014 (Zhang, Han, Ng, and Chan 2015).  
Finally, this thesis is motivated by the importance of understanding the 
relationship between audit firm/partner changes and debt financing. More 
restrictive terms of debt for companies with auditor changes affects their 
financial performance. Therefore, the findings of the thesis should have 
important implications for investors, corporate financial managers, and 
regulators.  
Given data availability, this study examines inside collateral and loan 
maturity as the terms of debt. Creditors consider default risks of companies 
when issuing debts. If companies cannot repay their debt, they must use 
collateral to offset it. Loans that require collateral and have shorter maturity 
imply stricter debt terms. I do not examine loan spread in this study due to 
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Chinese firms’ limited disclosure of this information.  
Researchers investigated how auditor changes may affect the cost of equity. 
However, the results are inconclusive. Some find negative market responses to 
auditor changes (Menon and Williams 2008; Shu 2000; Weiss and Kalbers 
2013), while others fail to find such a relationship (Beneish, Hopkins, Jansen, 
and Martin 2005; Klock 1994). This thesis investigates whether the debt 
market provides a clearer response related to a change in an auditor–client 
relationship.  
Banks have superior access to private information relative to public debt 
holders (Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008; Cole 1998). If auditor changes are 
associated with a change in loan terms, then this implies that auditor changes 
are useful, even for these informed creditors. This implication also stresses the 
importance of increased disclosure of auditor changes (e.g., detailed reasons 
and the circumstances of the change). China implemented mandatory audit 
partner and firm rotations, and therefore, apart from considering voluntary 
auditor changes as in existing literature, this thesis also considers the effects of 
mandatory auditor changes due to the regulatory policy on debt financing in 
China. This approach gives us a more complete analysis of the effects of 
different types of auditor changes on debt financing. 
I collect the sample of Chinese main-board A-share firm-year observations 
from 2007–2014 from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database. The study period commences in 2007 because China 
formally adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 
this year. I use logistic and linear regressions to examine the effects of the 
aforementioned changes on debt financing.  
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I find evidence that an audit partner change without a change in an audit 
firm worsens debt financing. Further, downward and lateral changes in audit 
firm also worsen debt financing. These results suggest that the information 
risks associated with auditor changes dominate the perceived increase in 
auditor independence. Further, I find evidence that maintaining the same audit 
partner after the audit partner moves to another firm worsens debt financing.  
This thesis offers several contributions to the existing literature. First, no 
study has thus far focused on China, which is important in the debt financing 
market as explained earlier. Second, there is no study on the effect of audit 
partner changes on debt financing. The US Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board requires disclosure of the name of the engagement partner for 
all public company audits issued on or after January 31, 2017. Therefore, 
research data for audit partner rotation are currently not available for U.S. 
public companies. Thus, due to data availability, I examine how audit partner 
and audit firm rotations affect debt financing in China. The disclosure of 
auditors’ names on audit reports allows an identification of audit partner 
rotations. The impact of auditor changes at different levels (firm and partner) 
and the direction of changes on debt financing can be examined 
comprehensively for the first time. Third, no study considers how personal 
relationships affect debt financing. In China, the audit partner often remains 
unchanged for a listed company, even when that audit partner moves to 
another audit firm. This kind of “auditor change” represents about 7% of the 
auditor changes in China. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese place more 
emphasis on personal relationships. In this thesis, I also examine this 
phenomenon to see how it affects debt financing. 
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The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 describes the 
relevant institutional background in China, provides a review of the literature 
and develops the research hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents the research methods. 
Chapter 4 discusses the empirical results. Chapter 5 presents the sensitivity 
tests. Chapter 6 concludes and discusses limitations and future research. 
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Chapter 2. Institutional Background, Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development 
 
2.1 Institutional Background 
 
2.1.1 Regulations covering audit quality and auditor changes in China 
Mandatory rotations of audit partners and audit firms 
The Enron/Arthur Andersen scandal raised global concerns about auditor 
independence and the need for an appropriate regulatory policy to enhance 
audit quality. Many jurisdictions adopted mandatory audit partner and/or audit 
firm rotations to maintain auditor independence and reduce the familiarity 
threat. Mandatory audit partner rotation is more common than mandatory audit 
firm rotation worldwide. For example, The U.S. and Australia implemented 
mandatory audit partner rotation every 5 years. The U.K. requires audit partner 
and audit firm rotation every 5 and 10 years, respectively. Table 1 summarizes 
the regulations related to audit partner and firm rotations in different 
jurisdictions. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
In China, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) jointly issued a policy in October 2003 that 
prohibits signing partners from providing audit services for the same listed 
entity for more than five consecutive years and the signing auditors cannot 
resume audit services for the firm within two years. In addition, signing 
auditors cannot provide audit services for more than two consecutive years for 
the same initial public offering entity (IPO). The regulations took effect on 1 
January 2004 (Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012). 
Apart from implementing mandatory audit partner rotation to maintain 
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auditor independence for listed entities, in 2005, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) 
required that each Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) switches its existing 
audit firm to a new audit firm if the existing audit firm has served the company 
for five consecutive years (Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012).  
 
2.1.2 Debt market in China 
China’s total debt has increased steadily since the global financial crisis. In 
China, total debt rose 465% over the past decade (Sun 2016). China’s debt 
grew to 247% of gross domestic product in 2015, from 160% in 2005, of 
which bank debt accounted for 19% of GDP in 2015 (Sun 2016). The leverage 
ratio grew from around 0.47 in 2002 to around 0.60 in 2014 for listed 
non-financial firms in China (Zhang, Han, Ng, and Chan 2015). This indicates 
the growing importance of debt markets in China. In China, the proportion of 
internal financing is relatively low, while the proportion of external financing 
is about 80% to 90% (Luo 2011). External financing includes equity and debt 
financing. Large firms in China favor debt financing (Chen, Jiang, and Lin 
2014): firms in the real estate industry borrow relatively more debt and firms 
in the manufacturing and utility industries use more long-term debt (Chen, 
Jiang, and Lin 2014). The leverage ratios for companies in the real estate and 
construction industries were consistently higher at the industry level from 
2007 to 2014, reaching 0.8 in 2014 (Roberts and Zurawski 2016).  
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
2.2.1 Audit quality 
Extant studies exclusively studied the difference in audit quality between 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. Based on a variety of audit-quality proxies, 
researchers find evidence suggesting that Big 4 audit firms provide higher 
quality audits than non-Big 4 audit firms do (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam 1998; Khurana and Raman 2004; Palmrose 1988). Big 4 audit 
firms have more incentives to provide higher quality audit services to maintain 
their reputation (DeAngelo 1981; Francis and Wilson 1988). Big 4 audit firms 
have more motivation to ensure the credibility of their clients’ financial 
statements to avoid litigation exposure (Khurana and Raman 2004). Audit 
clients with higher agency conflicts are more likely to choose reputed audit 
firms to adopt credible monitoring (DeFond 1992). I therefore expect higher 
audit quality for Big N firms than for non-Big N firms. The audit quality of 
audit partners within an audit firm should be similar because audit partners in 
the same firm usually have similar audit competence under the same quality 
control system. 
 
2.2.2 Auditor rotations and audit quality 
Prior studies document that auditors play an important role in ensuring the 
credibility and accuracy of financial statements, to reduce the corporate 
agency problems, and hence lower the cost of equity capital (Fernando, 
Abdel-Meguid, and Elder 2010; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005). 
Other studies also show that auditor rotations can help to maintain auditors’ 
independence and objectivity (Gietzmann and Sen 2002; Hussey and Lan 
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2001). However, auditor changes serve as a “red flag” that financial reporting 
uncertainties will be higher (Lu 2006). If there is a disruption in an 
auditor-client relationship at the audit firm level, external users of financial 
statements will suspect that the auditor’s monitoring function may be 
compromised, which can increase firms’ information risks (Menon and 
Williams 2008).  
Since switching to a new auditor involves a high start-up cost, voluntary 
audit partner and audit firm changes provide signals to creditors that the 
companies are opinions shopping (Matsumura, Subramanyam, and Tucker 
1997). If the incumbent auditor issues a qualified audit opinion to a company, 
the company wants to switch to another audit firm that the company will have 
more influence on the auditors to have a better audit opinion (Chow and Rice 
1982).  
Apart from the signal of opinion shopping, auditor changes causes a loss of 
existing auditors’ cumulative knowledge of the companies and hence can 
lower the audit quality (Sayyar, Basiruddin, Zaleha Abdul Rasid, and Sayyar 
2014). 
Extant research studies find that the effects of audit partner rotation on audit 
quality are mixed. Fargher, Lee, and Mande (2008) find that there is a positive 
relationship between audit partner changes and audit quality in the Australian 
setting which use abnormal accruals as a proxy for audit quality. They suggest 
audit quality increases after audit partner rotations because of the increased 
independence to the audit engagement. However, Chen, Lin, and Lin (2008) 
find that audit quality deteriorates after audit partners switch using 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality. Audit quality and the 
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length of auditor tenure are positively related because of the reduced 
information asymmetry between auditors and audit clients (Solomon, Shield, 
and Whittington 1999). Chen, Peng, Xue, Yang, and Ye (2016) suggest that 
companies also engage in partner-level opinion shopping by seeking another 
partner who is more willing to give them a clean opinion. Audit clients are 
more likely to engage in successful partner-level opinion shopping if they are 
economically essential to the audit firm. Therefore, in this situation, auditors’ 
monitoring function will be compromised, which leads to higher information 
risks and uncertainties.  
Since China requires a disclosure of signing partners’ names on audit reports, 
creditors should be able to discover mandatory audit partner changes by 
examining the disclosure over time. Since audit reports also disclose audit 
firms, creditors can also detect mandatory audit firm changes for SOEs by 
examining the disclosure over time. 
Mandatory auditor rotations, either at partner or firm levels, aim to increase 
auditor independence, reduce over the familiarity and self-interest threats to 
enhance audit quality at the expense of a loss of current auditor’s cumulative 
knowledge of the company (Ghosh and Moon 2005; Mansi, Maxwell, and 
Miller 2004). Kwon, Lim, and Simnett (2014) find that audit quality measured 
by abnormal discretionary accrual does not significantly change with 
mandatory audit firm rotation in the South Korean setting. Firth, Rui, and Wu 
(2012) also find that mandatory auditor changes at both the audit partner and 
audit firm levels provide fresh perspectives, but leads to a loss of current 
auditors’ accumulated knowledge of the client’s auditing process, which will 
increase financial reporting risks. The disadvantages offset the perceived 
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benefits; thus, empirically, the net effects of mandatory auditor rotations at 
both levels are not clear. 
 
2.2.3 Audit quality and the cost of debt 
Higher-quality audits can reduce financial information uncertainties for 
lenders and thus enhance the efficiency of debt contracting (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Creditors may perceive that companies audited by Big N 
audit firms have higher-quality audits, which reduces information asymmetry 
between creditors and firm managers. Consequently, companies with 
higher-quality audits will have a lower cost of debt (Causholli and Knechel 
2012). Retaining Big-N auditors enhances the reliability and credibility of 
financial statements, which reduces monitoring costs (Pittman and Fortin 
2004). Lenders perceive companies employing auditors with a higher 
reputation as more trustworthy (Pittman and Fortin 2004). There is a negative 
relationship between Big 4 audits and the cost of debt. Companies with 
modified audit opinions are associated with a higher cost of debt (Karjalainen 
2011). Therefore, higher-quality audits should generally have a lower cost of 
debt. Francis, Hunter, Robinson, Robinson, and Yuan (2016) find that 
voluntary auditor changes provide a signal to creditors that companies are 
“opinion shopping” and implies a higher information risk. Thus, loan spreads 
should increase after auditor changes.  
With higher information risks but essentially the same audit quality controls, 
I expect that a voluntary audit partner change without an audit firm change and 
lateral changes in audit firms will worsen debt financing. I also expect that the 
audit quality for voluntary audit firm changes in the downward direction will 
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be lower. Therefore, voluntary audit firms in downward changes should 
worsen debt financing. Finally, although voluntary audit firm rotations may 
induce higher information risks that may impair audit quality, Big N audit 
firms usually provide better audit services because they have more competent 
staff and more comprehensive accounting systems (Behn, Choi, and Kang 
2008). Thus, the effect of a voluntary audit firm change in an upward direction 
(i.e., from non-Big N to Big N) on debt financing is uncertain. The net effects 
of mandatory auditor rotations at both audit firm and audit partner levels are 
not clear. 
As a result, I formulate the following hypotheses.  
 
2.2.4 Hypotheses 
Considering the combined effect of voluntary and mandatory audit firm 
changes, the impact of an audit firm change in an upward direction on debt 
financing is uncertain. 
𝑯𝑯𝟏𝟏: Upward audit firm changes will lead to a change in debt financing. 
Considering the combined effect of voluntary and mandatory audit firm 
changes, downward audit firm changes will worsen debt financing because 
voluntary downward changes will worsen debt financing, while the effect of 
mandatory changes on debt financing is uncertain. 
𝑯𝑯𝟐𝟐: Downward audit firm changes will worsen debt financing. 
Considering the effects of voluntary and mandatory changes, lateral audit 
firm changes will worsen debt financing because voluntary lateral changes will 
worsen debt financing, while the effect of mandatory audit firm changes is 
uncertain. 
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𝑯𝑯𝟑𝟑: Lateral audit firm changes will worsen debt financing. 
Considering the effects of voluntary and mandatory changes, an audit 
partner change without an audit firm change will worsen debt financing 
because a voluntary audit partner change without a change in an audit firm 
will worsen debt financing, while the effect of mandatory audit partner 
changes on debt financing is uncertain. 
𝑯𝑯𝟒𝟒: An audit partner change without an audit firm change will worsen 
debt financing. 
When the audit partner remains the same for a listed company, even the 
partner changes to another audit firm, I expect a worsening of debt financing 
because creditors will question the intention of this special arrangement. Since 
creditors consider that this change will increase the information risks and 
familiarity threat, this situation should worsen debt financing. 
𝑯𝑯𝟓𝟓: Keeping the same audit partner while changing the audit firm will 
worsen debt financing. 
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Chapter 3. Research Methods 
3.1 Data collection 
The sample of the Chinese main-board, non-financial, A-share firm-year 
observations from 2007-2014 have been collected from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. I also collect 
information from other sources such as websites of the listed companies. I start 
from 2007 because that is the year when the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) was formally adopted in China. Sample firms without bank 
debts are excluded in the sample. Firms in the financial sector are also 
excluded in the sample because of their special reporting requirements. I start 
with 15,076 non-financial year-observations and reduce to 4,353 because of no 
bank debts and financial data. 
 
3.2 Statistical model 
To test the hypotheses, I use collateral as the dependent variable. Loan 
spread is not chosen due to the limited disclosure of this information by 
Chinese listed companies. Collateral is used to repay the debt in case the 
company fails to repay the debt. The common forms of collateral in China 
include land use right and real estate. Therefore, a loan obligation that requires 
collateral implies a stricter loan term. I use logistic regression to test the 
hypotheses.  
 
Collateral = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Firm_Up + 𝛽𝛽2Firm_Down + 𝛽𝛽3Firm_Lateral + 
𝛽𝛽4Man_Firm_Change + 𝛽𝛽5 Partner_Change + Control +ε                  
(1) 
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Collateral = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange + 
𝛽𝛽2Man_Partner_Change + Control +ε                                                        
(2) 
 
Collateral = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change + 
𝛽𝛽2Man_Firm_Change + Control+ε                                                        
(3) 
 
Collateral is coded as one if bank debt is backed by any collaterals and is 
coded as zero otherwise. Having collateral in the loan obligation implies a 
stricter loan term and an auditor’s assessment of a higher risk transaction. 
Firm_Up is coded as one if an audit firm changes from non-Big N to Big N 
and zero otherwise. Firm_Down is coded as one if an audit firm changes from 
Big N to non-Big N and zero otherwise. Firm_Lateral is coded as one if an 
audit firm changes from Big N to Big N and non-Big N to non-Big N and zero 
otherwise. All the above audit firm changes include both voluntary and 
mandatory audit firm rotations. Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange is coded as 
one in the situation that an audit partner change without an audit firm change 
and zero for no change in an audit firm and no change in audit partners. 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change is coded as one in the situation where there 
is no change in audit partners but there is an audit firm change and zero for no 
change in an audit firm and no change in audit partners. Man_Firm_Change is 
coded as one if there is a mandatory audit firm change and zero otherwise. 
Man_Partner_Change is coded as one if there is a mandatory audit partner 
change and zero otherwise. Partner_Change is coded as one if there is an audit 
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partner change and zero otherwise. 
If the audit firm is not the same as the one in the previous year, a rotation of 
audit firm is identified. I identify mandatory audit firm rotation if the audit 
firm has reached the maximum number of years serving a listed company set 
by the regulation. Merger between firms is also regarded as a mandatory audit 
firm rotation. If any one of the signing partners changes in year t from year t-1, 
I identify a rotation of audit partner. I identify mandatory audit partner rotation 
if the audit partner has reached the maximum number of years serving as a 
listed company set by the regulation. 
Equation (1) is used to test for Hypotheses (1), (2), and (3). In the thesis, 
Big N firms include Big 4 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young, 
and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu) and BDO. Since BDO ranked fourth in China 
based on the ranking released by the Chinese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (CICPA) in 2014, it is reasonable to include BDO as one of the 
Big N audit firms. BDO has gained reputation and provided high-quality 
services similar to the Big 4 audit firms. If an audit firm is changed from 
non-Big N to Big N, this change is regarded as an upward change and vice 
versa. Other audit firm changes are regarded as lateral audit firm changes. 
Since there are situations where there is no change in audit partners, but there 
is an audit firm change, the audit partner change is added in the Equation (1) to 
control the effect of the audit partner rotation. Equation (2) is used to test for 
Hypothesis (4) and Equation (3) is used to test for Hypothesis (5).  
Control variables in regression models include Prior_MAO, Age, Leverage, 
Loan_Size, Current_Ratio, CFO, Industry_Dummy, and Year dummies. 
Prior_MAO is coded as one if the company received modified audit opinion in 
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the previous year and zero otherwise. Prior_MAO is expected to be positively 
related to loan terms (Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012; Francis, Hunter, Robinson, 
Robinson, and Yuan 2016). A company with a modified audit opinion in the 
previous year is expected to have higher litigation and audit risks, and poorer 
financial performances than other companies. The ability of repaying debts for 
those companies with a modified audit opinion in the previous year will be 
lowered. Thus, creditors will require collateral in their loan obligations. Age is 
the number of years since the company has been listed. Age is expected to be 
positively related to loan terms, as older firms are more likely to have 
exhausted the capital since listed, resulting in a higher chance of financial 
distress (Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012). Leverage is calculated with the total 
liabilities to total assets ratio. Leverage is expected to be positively associated 
with loan terms. It measures the ability of a company to repay the debt and the 
capacity to resist the external shocks. Higher leverage involves higher default 
risks, therefore, creditors will require collateral for those companies with 
higher leverage ratios (Bacha 2014; Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012; Pittman and 
Fortin 2004; Francis, Hunter, Robinson, Robinson, and Yuan 2016). Loan_Size 
is a natural logarithm of the loan size. Loan_Size is expected to be negatively 
related to loan terms, as borrowers with low default risks are able to borrow 
more debts (Yu 2005). CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by total 
assets. CFO is expected to be negatively associated with loan terms. 
Companies with higher CFO imply they have a higher flexibility of the usage 
of cash flows. Companies with more cash are expected to have a lower risk of 
default (Pittman and Fortin 2004). Current_Ratio is current assets to current 
liabilities ratio. Current_Ratio is expected to be negatively associated with 
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loan terms. Companies with a higher liquidity are expected to have a lower 
risk of bankruptcy and have a higher ability to repay the debt (Oh, Park and 
Hong 2016). Industry_Dummy is coded as one if a company is in the 
manufacturing sector and zero otherwise. Manufacturing companies and 
non-manufacturing companies are different in terms of business nature, 
business environment, and assets structure. Year dummies are also included in 
the regression models. 
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Chapter 4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and 
all the independent variables in Equation (1). Seventy-one percent of the 
sample firm years have collateral in their loans. Among different types of audit 
firm changes, most of the audit firm changes are lateral audit firm changes, 
which are about sixteen percent, while upward audit firm changes and 
downward audit firm changes are about one percent and one percent 
respectively. 
(Insert Table 2 Panel A here) 
 
Table 2 Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and 
all the independent variables in Equation (2). Sixty-nine percent of the sample 
firm years have collateral in their loans. The situation of an audit partner 
change without an audit firm change is about fifty-five percent of the sample 
firm years.  
 (Insert Table 2 Panel B here) 
 
Table 2 Panel C presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and 
all the independent variables in Equation (3). Sixty-eight percent of the sample 
firm years have collateral in their loans. The situation of no change in audit 
partners, but an audit firm change is about eleven percent of the sample firm 
years.  
 (Insert Table 2 Panel C here) 
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4.2 Correlation Matrix 
Table 3 Panel A shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent 
variable and all independent variables in Equation (1). I find that downward 
audit firm change, lateral audit firm change, and audit partner change are 
positively and significantly related to collateral. However, I find no significant 
correlation between mandatory audit firm rotation and collateral. Age and 
Leverage are positively and significantly correlated with collateral. Loan_Size, 
CFO, and Current_Ratio are negatively and significantly correlated with 
collateral. The direction of all these independent variables is consistent with 
prior studies. The correlations among most of the independent variables are 
less than 0.5. The correlation coefficient above 0.5 includes -0.599 (Age and 
Industry_Dummy). The highest variance inflation factor is 1.865. Therefore, 
multicollinearity should not be a problem in the regression.  
(Insert Table 3 Panel A here) 
 
Table 3 Panel B shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent 
variable and all independent variables in Equation (2). I find that an audit 
partner change without an audit firm change is positively and significantly 
correlated to collateral. However, I find no significant correlation between 
mandatory audit partner rotation and collateral. Loan_Size, CFO, and 
Current_Ratio are negatively and significantly correlated with collateral. Age 
and Leverage are positively and significantly correlated with collateral. The 
direction of all these independent variables is consistent with prior studies. The 
correlations among most of the independent variables are less than 0.5. The 
correlation coefficient above 0.5 is -0.612 (Age and Industry_Dummy). The 
 21 
highest variance inflation factor is 1.912. Therefore, multicollinearity should 
not be a problem in my regression.  
 (Insert Table 3 Panel B here) 
 
Table 3 Panel C shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent 
variable and all independent variables in Equation (3). I find no change in 
audit partners, but an audit firm change is positively and significantly related 
to collateral. Moreover, I find mandatory audit firm rotation in this situation is 
positively and significantly related to collateral. However, as I do not control 
other variables that may have effects on debt financing, I cannot draw strong 
inferences from the correlation table. Age and Leverage are positively and 
significantly correlated with collateral. Loan_Size, CFO, and Current_Ratio 
are negatively and significantly correlated with collateral. The direction of all 
these independent variables is consistent with prior studies. The correlations 
among most of the independent variables are less than 0.5. The correlation 
coefficients above 0.5 include 0.554 (Man_Firm_Change and 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change) and -0.612 (Age and Industry_Dummy). 
The highest variance inflation factor is 1.964. Therefore, multicollinearity 
should not be a problem in my regression.  
 (Insert Table 3 Panel C here) 
 
4.3 Main results of logistic regression analyses 
Table 4 presents the results for Equation (1). The total sample is 4353 firm 
years. Upward audit firm change is negatively and significantly related to 
collateral at the 0.05 level. This indicates that the effects of higher-quality 
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audits and better quality control system on debt financing are larger than that 
of higher information risks. Downward audit firm change and lateral audit firm 
change are positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.1 level. 
This implies that with higher information risks and lower-quality audits or 
unchanged audit quality, creditors require stricter loan terms. Since the 
monitoring function of auditors is compromised, creditors more likely require 
collateral for those companies with audit firms in downward or lateral changes. 
In case of an audit partner change, creditors also require stricter loan term as 
an audit partner change implies higher financial reporting uncertainties and 
risks. However, I cannot find any evidence on the relationship between 
mandatory audit firm rotation and collateral. Age and Leverage are 
significantly and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. Loan_Size is 
significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. CFO is 
significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.05 level. The direction 
of the aforementioned control variables is consistent with prior studies.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
Table 5 presents the results for Equation (2). The total sample is 3555 firm 
years. To avoid the confounding effect of audit firm changes, the situations of 
an audit firm change with an audit partner change and no change in audit 
partners but with an audit firm change are eliminated. An audit partner change 
without an audit firm change is significantly and positively related to collateral 
at the 0.05 level. This implies that creditors perceive higher information risks 
and uncertainties for those companies with an audit partner change. Further, 
this indicates that creditors perceive that an audit partner change is a kind of 
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“opinion shopping” and hence they require stricter loan terms for those 
companies. However, I cannot find any evidence on the relationship between 
mandatory audit partner rotation and collateral. Age and Leverage are 
significantly and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. Loan_Size is 
significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. CFO is 
significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.05 level. The direction 
of the aforementioned control variables is consistent with prior studies. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
Table 6 presents the results for Equation (3). The total sample is 1799 firm 
years. To avoid the confounding effect of audit partner changes, the situations 
of an audit firm change with an audit partner change and an audit partner 
change without an audit firm change are eliminated. No change in audit 
partners, but an audit firm change is significantly and positively related to 
collateral at the 0.1 level. This implies that creditors consider that this kind of 
change will lead to higher information risks and will lead to a higher risk of 
familiarity threat. However, I cannot find any evidence on the relationship 
between mandatory audit firm rotation and collateral. Age and Leverage are 
significantly and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. Loan_Size 
and CFO are significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. 
The direction of the aforementioned control variables is consistent with prior 
studies. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
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Chapter 5. Sensitivity Tests 
5.1 Loan maturity as the dependent variable 
Loan maturity is used as a dependent variable to check the robustness of the 
main findings. Similar to the requirement of a collateral, shorter loan maturity 
implies a stricter loan term, as lenders perceive a higher risk of loan. As a 
result, borrowers will be less flexible in the use of cash flows. I use linear 
regression to test the hypotheses. 
 
Loan_Maturity = 𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1Firm_Change + 𝛽𝛽2Man_Firm_Change + 
𝛽𝛽3Partner_Change + Control + ε                                        
(4) 
 
Loan_Maturity = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Firm_Down/Lateral + 𝛽𝛽2Man_Firm_Change + 
𝛽𝛽3Partner_Change + Control + ε                                        
(5) 
 
Loan_Maturity = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange + 
𝛽𝛽2Man_Partner_Change + Control + ε                                   
(6) 
 
Loan_Maturity = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change + 
𝛽𝛽2Man_Firm_Change + Control + ε                                     
(7) 
 
Loan_Maturity is the length of the loan term. Firm_Change is coded as one 
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if there is an audit firm change and zero otherwise. Firm_Down/Lateral is 
coded as one if an audit firm changes from Big N to non-Big N, Big N to Big 
N, and non-Big N to non-Big N and zero otherwise. 
Since the sample size of upward audit firm change is not large enough 
(n=18), I test the effect of all audit firm changes in Equation (4). There are 
2210 observations. Table 7 presents the results for all audit firm changes on 
loan maturity. Firm_Change is significantly and negatively related to loan 
maturity at the 0.05 level. Creditors give shorter loan maturity to those 
companies with an audit firm change. This indicates that creditors consider 
companies with an audit firm change as having a higher information 
uncertainty and risk. Partner_Change is negatively and significantly related to 
loan maturity at the 0.1 level. Creditors perceive the effect of enhancing audit 
independence being smaller than the effect of increasing information risks. 
However, I cannot find any evidence on the relationship between mandatory 
audit firm rotation and loan maturity. These results are consistent with the 
main findings.  
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
In the main test, I find the upward audit firm changes being negatively 
related to collateral. To exclude the effect of upward audit firm changes on 
loan maturity, I exclude upward audit firm changes in Equation (5). There are 
2192 samples. Table 8 presents the results for Equation (5). Downward and 
lateral audit firm changes are significantly and negatively related to loan 
maturity at the 0.05 level, which is consistent with the results in the main test 
and the results in Equation (4).  
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(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
Table 9 presents the results for Equation (6). There are 1772 samples. An 
audit partner change without an audit firm change is significantly and 
negatively related to loan maturity at the 0.05 level. However, I cannot find 
any evidence on the relationship between mandatory audit partner rotation and 
loan maturity. Other control variables are broadly consistent with those 
reported in prior studies. These results are consistent with the main findings. 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
 
Table 10 presents the results for Equation (7). There are 888 samples. No 
change in audit partners, but an audit firm change is significantly and 
negatively related to loan maturity at the 0.05 level. However, I cannot find 
any evidence on the relationship between mandatory audit firm rotation and 
loan maturity. Other control variables are broadly consistent with those 
reported in prior studies. These results are consistent with the main findings. 
(Insert Table 10 here) 
 
5.2 Control the direction of audit firm changes in the situation of no 
change in audit partners, but an audit firm change 
The upward audit firm changes are significantly and negatively related to 
collateral in the main results. Hence, to control the effect of upward audit firm 
changes, only no change in audit partners but with an audit firm change in 
downward and lateral directions is tested for both collateral and loan maturity. 
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change in downward and lateral 
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directions is positively related to collateral at the 0.05 level and negatively 
related to loan maturity at the 0.05 level. These results imply that creditors will 
issue strict loan term to those companies with this kind of auditor changes. The 
results are consistent with the main findings. 
(Insert Table 11 here) 
(Insert Table 12 here) 
 
5.3 Alternative measures of audit firm changes  
In the main test, Big 5 audit firms (i.e., Big 4 and BDO) are used for the 
measure of audit firm changes. In the sensitivity test, Big 4 audit firms are 
used for an alternative measure of audit firm changes. Since upward audit firm 
changes (i.e., non-Big 4 to Big 4) are not large enough for both collateral 
(n=14) and loan maturity (n=1), and the upward audit firm changes are 
negatively and significantly related to collateral in the main results, only 
downward and lateral audit firm changes are tested. Downward and lateral 
audit firm changes are positively and significantly related to collateral at the 
0.1 level and negatively and significantly related to loan maturity at the 0.05 
level. This implies creditors perceive higher information risks for those 
companies with this kind of change and hence they will issue strict loan term 
in the loan obligation. The results are consistent with the main findings. Apart 
from Big 5 audit firms, Big 10 audit firms are used for an alternative measure 
of audit firm changes to check the robustness of the main test. Upward audit 
firm change is negatively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.05 
level and positively and significantly related to loan maturity at the 0.1 level. 
Downward audit firm changes are positively and significantly related to 
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collateral at the 0.1 level and negatively and significantly related to loan 
maturity at the 0.05 level. Lateral audit firm changes are positively and 
significantly related to collateral at the 0.1 level and negatively and 
significantly related to loan maturity at the 0.01 level. This implies creditors 
perceive higher information risks for those companies with downward and 
lateral audit firm changes and hence they will issue strict loan term in the loan 
obligation. The results are consistent with the main findings. 
 (Insert Table 13 here) 
 (Insert Table 14 here) 
(Insert Table 15 here) 
(Insert Table 16 here) 
 
5.4 Measuring the dependent variable in a change form 
  Dependent variable is measured in a change form to test the robustness of 
the main test. Collateral is measured in a change form that a dummy variable 
equal to one if bank debt is backed by stricter collateral (i.e. increase in 
collateral) and zero otherwise. Upward audit firm change is negatively and 
significantly related to collateral at the 0.1 level. Downward audit firm change 
is positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.05 level and lateral 
audit firm change is positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.01 
level. An audit partner change without an audit firm change is significantly 
and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. No change in audit 
partners, but an audit firm change is significantly and positively related to 
collateral at the 0.01 level. The results are consistent with the main findings. 
(Insert Table 17 here) 
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(Insert Table 18 here) 
(Insert Table 19 here) 
 
5.5 Measuring the dependent variable in a change form with firm fixed 
effect 
  Dependent variable is measured in a change form with firm fixed effect to 
test the robustness of the main test. Collateral is measured in a change form 
that a dummy variable equal to one if bank debt is backed by stricter collateral 
(i.e. increase in collateral), and zero otherwise. Downward and lateral audit 
firm changes are positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.01 
level. An audit partner change without an audit firm change is significantly 
and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. No change in audit 
partners, but an audit firm change is significantly and positively related to 
collateral at the 0.01 level. The results are broadly consistent with the main 
findings. 
(Insert Table 20 here) 
(Insert Table 21 here) 
(Insert Table 22 here) 
 
 
5.6 Consideration of state-owned enterprise 
  Since whether a firm is a state-owned enterprise may affect the loan terms, a 
dummy variable - state-owned enterprise is added to check the robustness of 
the main test. Upward audit firm change is negatively and significantly related 
to collateral at the 0.1 level. Downward and lateral audit firm changes are 
positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.1 level. An audit 
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partner change without an audit firm change is significantly and positively 
related to collateral at the 0.05 level. No change in audit partners, but an audit 
firm change is significantly and positively related to collateral at the 0.1 level. 
The results are consistent with the main findings. 
(Insert Table 23 here) 
(Insert Table 24 here) 
(Insert Table 25 here) 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research 
6.1 Conclusion 
Independent auditors help in reducing agency problems between companies 
and users of financial statements. They serve as a monitoring function for 
creditors. After several major audit scandals and frauds, the issue of ensuring 
audit quality becomes a great concern for creditors, investors, regulators, and 
various kinds of users of financial statements. Auditor changes can help 
increase the audit independence and provide “fresh eyes” to the audit 
engagement. However, auditor changes cause a loss of cumulative knowledge 
for current auditors for that audit engagement, which will affect the overall 
audit quality. Therefore, whether auditor changes provide useful information to 
creditors, which affect loan terms in the loan obligation, is an empirical 
question.  
In this thesis, I have used Chinese data that enables to clarify both audit firm 
and audit partner rotations. Overall, I find that debt financing is worsened by 
various kinds of auditor changes including: downward audit firm changes, 
lateral audit firm changes, a change in an audit partner without a change in an 
audit firm, and a change in an audit firm without a change in audit partners. 
This indicates that generally, auditor changes provide a signal to creditors that 
the monitoring function of auditors is compromised, leading to a higher 
information uncertainty and hence require stricter loan terms for those 
companies with auditor changes.  
The findings of this research should have important implications for users of 
financial statements. Overall, since auditor changes worsen debt financing, the 
financial performance of a company will be adversely affected. The 
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monitoring function of auditors will also be compromised for those companies 
with auditor changes. Investors should take these aspects into consideration 
before making an investment decision to avoid investment losses. Corporate 
financial managers should be aware that creditors generally require stricter 
loan terms for those companies with auditor changes. Stricter loan terms will 
affect the financial performance of a company. Stock price and the interests of 
stakeholders will also be affected. Therefore, corporate financial managers 
should carefully consider the necessity and effects before changing auditors. 
Auditor changes are associated with a change in debt financing. This 
indicates that auditor changes are useful even for these informed creditors. 
This implication also addresses the importance of expanded disclosure of 
auditor changes such as the detailed reasons and circumstances of the changes. 
Regulators may consider further expansion of disclosure of auditor changes in 
audit reports to prevent further audit scandals.  
 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
There are some limitations of this thesis and there are some 
recommendations for future research. First, due to the limited disclosures of 
loan spread by Chinese listed companies, loan spread is not used in this thesis. 
If there are more disclosures of loan spread by Chinese listed companies in the 
future, loan spread can be used to have greater insights on the relationship 
between auditor changes and the cost of debts. 
Second, greater insights can be obtained if the specific reasons for voluntary 
auditor changes could be examined. However, due to data limitation, it is 
suggested that this issue can be investigated for future research if there are 
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more details of the disclosure of auditor changes in the future. Hence, a more 
thorough analysis on the relationship between auditor changes and debt 
financing can be obtained. 
Third, since the impact of voluntary and mandatory auditor changes on debt 
financing may be different, it is suggested that researchers can further 
investigate and analyze the reasons behind in the future. Hence, a more 
comprehensive investigation on the relationship of auditor changes and debt 
financing can be provided and the findings can have more implications for 
investors and corporate managers. 
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Table 1: Mandatory audit firm and audit partner rotations in different 
jurisdictions 
 Audit firm rotation Audit partner rotation 
Australia No Yes - every 5 years 
Austria Yes - every 5 years for 
government-owned companies 
Yes - every 5 years 
Belgium No  Yes - every 6 years 
Brazil Yes - every 5 years No 
Bulgaria No Yes - every 5 years 
Canada No Yes - every 7 years 
China Yes - every 5 years for 
state-owned enterprises  
Yes – every 5 years 
Croatia Yes - every 7 years for banks and 
every 4 years for insurance and 
leasing companies   
Yes - every 7 years 
Cyprus No Yes - every 7 years 
Czech Republic No Yes - every 7 years 
Denmark No Yes - every 7 years 
Finland No Yes - every 7 years 
France No Yes - every 6 years 
Germany No Yes - every 7 years 
Greece No Yes - every 7 years 
Hungary No Yes - every 7 years 
Ireland No Yes - every 5 years  
Italy Yes - every 9 years Yes - every 7 years 
Latvia No Yes - every 7 years  
Luxembourg No Yes - every 7 years 
Malta No Yes - every 7 years 
Poland No Yes - every 5 years 
Portugal No Yes - every 7 years 
Romania No Yes - every 7 years  
Slovakia Yes - every 5 years Yes - every 5 years 
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Slovenia Yes - every 5 years for the 
banking and insurance industry 
Yes - every 7 years  
South Korea No No 
Spain No Yes - every 7 years 
Sweden No Yes - every 7 years 
The Netherlands No Yes - every 7 years 
Turkey Yes - every 7 years Yes - every 5 years 
U.K. Yes - every 10 years Yes - every 5 years  
U.S. No Yes - every 5 years 
Source: EY Global Financial Services Institute 2015 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 Panel A: Descriptive statistics for Equation (1) 
 
N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Collateral 4353 0.71  0.46  
Firm_Up 4353 0.01  0.12  
Firm_Down 4353 0.01  0.08  
Firm_Lateral 4353 0.16  0.37  
Man_Firm_Change 4353 0.05  0.21  
Partner_Change 4353 0.59  0.49  
Prior_MAO 4353 0.01  0.10  
Age 4353 11.53  5.61  
Leverage 4353 0.54  0.25  
Loan_Size 4353 18.75  1.51  
CFO 4353 0.03  0.08  
Current_Ratio 4353 1.64  2.10  
Industry_Dummy 4353 0.17  0.37  
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Table 2 Panel B: Descriptive statistics for Equation (2) 
 
N Mean Standard Deviation 
Collateral 3555 0.69 0.46 
Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange 
3555 0.55 0.50 
Man_Partner_Change 
3555 0.05 0.23 
Prior_MAO 
3555 0.01 0.08 
Age 3555 11.63 5.66 
Leverage 3555 0.54 0.25 
Loan_Size 3555 18.81 1.51 
CFO 3555 0.03 0.08 
Current_Ratio 3555 1.63 1.87 
Industry_Dummy 3555 0.17 0.38 
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Table 2 Panel C: Descriptive statistics for Equation (3) 
 
N Mean Standard Deviation 
Collateral 1799 0.68 0.47 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change 
1799 0.11 0.31 
Man_Firm_Change 
1799 0.04 0.19 
Prior_MAO 
1799 0.01 0.10 
Age 1799 11.61 5.85 
Leverage 1799 0.54 0.28 
Loan_Size 1799 18.81 1.54 
CFO 1799 0.03 0.08 
Current_Ratio 
1799 1.63 1.67 
Industry_Dummy 1799 0.18 0.38 
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Table 4: The effects of audit firm changes on debt financing 
 Expected sign Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? 6.873 0.000*** 
Firm_Up ? -0.604 0.047** 
Firm_Down + 1.145 0.081* 
Firm_Lateral + 0.250 0.067* 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.082 0.697 
Partner_Change + 0.128 0.094* 
Prior_MAO + 0.241 0.584 
Age + 0.036 0.000*** 
Leverage + 1.249 0.000*** 
Loan_Size - -0.415 0.000*** 
CFO - -1.047 0.032** 
Current_Ratio - -0.004 0.836 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.284 0.028** 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.184 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.262 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
Upward audit firm change: 60 
Downward audit firm change: 26 
Lateral audit firm change: 712 
No change in an audit firm: 3555 
Total N: 4353 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 5: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm 
change on debt financing 
 Expected sign Coefficient Sig. 
Constant ? 7.555 0.000*** 
Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange + 0.208 0.013** 
Man_Partner_Change ? -0.082 0.665 
Prior_MAO + 0.236 0.667 
Age  + 0.035 0.000*** 
Leverage + 1.489 0.000*** 
Loan_Size - -0.458 0.000*** 
CFO - -1.388 0.011** 
Current_Ratio - -0.003 0.878 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.235 0.097* 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.199 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.280 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 1949 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606 
Total N: 3555 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 6: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm 
change on debt financing 
 Expected sign Coefficient Sig. 
Constant ? 7.886 0.000*** 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change + 0.525 0.068* 
Man_Firm_Change ? 0.560 0.203 
Prior_MAO + -0.107 0.866 
Age  + 0.037 0.006*** 
Leverage + 1.237 0.001*** 
Loan_Size - -0.463 0.000*** 
CFO - -2.123 0.005*** 
Current_Ratio - -0.028 0.438 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.192 0.325 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.201 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.281 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 193 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606 
Total N: 1799 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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 Table 7: The effect of all audit firm changes on loan maturity  
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Expected sign Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? -5.730 0.000*** 
Firm_Change - -0.354 0.013** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.306 0.199 
Partner_Change - -0.170 0.079* 
Prior_MAO - -0.256 0.575 
Age - 0.004 0.710 
Leverage - 0.064 0.796 
Loan_Size + 0.423 0.000*** 
CFO + 0.788 0.172 
Current_Ratio + -0.002 0.934 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.422 0.014** 
Year dummies: Included 
R Square: 0.093 
Adjusted R Square: 0.086 
Dependent variable: Loan maturity 
All audit firm changes: 438 
No change in an audit firm: 1772 
Total N: 2210 
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Table 8: The effect of downward & lateral audit firm changes on loan 
maturity  
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? -5.711 0.000*** 
Firm_ Down/Lateral - -0.354 0.015** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.295 0.223 
Partner_Change - -0.168 0.085* 
Prior_MAO - -0.260 0.569 
Age - 0.004 0.709 
Leverage - 0.070 0.777 
Loan_Size + 0.422 0.000*** 
CFO + 0.774 0.181 
Current_Ratio + -0.002 0.930 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.421 0.015** 
Year dummies: Included 
R Square: 0.092 
Adjusted R Square: 0.085 
Dependent variable: Loan maturity 
Downward & lateral audit firm changes: 420 
No change in an audit firm: 1772 
Total N: 2192 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 9: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm 
change on loan maturity  
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? -6.079 0.000*** 
Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange - -0.249 0.029** 
Man_Partner_Change ? -0.067 0.779 
Prior_MAO - -0.141 0.824 
Age - -0.001 0.964 
Leverage - 0.294 0.353 
Loan_Size + 0.436 0.000*** 
CFO + 1.342 0.053* 
Current_Ratio + 0.004 0.901 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.464 0.021** 
Year dummies: Included 
R Square: 0.090 
Adjusted R Square: 0.082 
Dependent variable: Loan maturity 
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 988 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 784 
Total N: 1772 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 10: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm 
change on loan maturity 
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? -5.068 0.000*** 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change - -0.684 0.046** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.320 0.555 
Prior_MAO - -0.306 0.704 
Age - -0.013 0.529 
Leverage - 0.164 0.730 
Loan_Size + 0.404 0.000*** 
CFO + 1.596 0.135 
Current_Ratio + -0.018 0.765 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.606 0.049** 
Year dummies: Included 
R Square: 0.080 
Adjusted R Square: 0.063 
Dependent variable: Loan maturity 
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 104 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 784 
Total N: 888 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 11: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm 
change in downward and lateral directions on debt financing  
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient Sig. 
Constant ? 7.963 0.000*** 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Down/Lateral  + 0.675 0.025** 
Man_Firm_Change ? 0.421 0.348 
Prior_MAO + -0.116 0.856 
Age  + 0.037 0.007*** 
Leverage + 1.250 0.001*** 
Loan_Size - -0.467 0.000*** 
CFO - -2.165 0.004*** 
Current_Ratio - -0.029 0.427 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.185 0.345 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.204 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.285 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change in downward and lateral 
directions: 191 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606 
Total N: 1797 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 12: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm 
change in downward and lateral directions on loan maturity  
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? -5.077 0.000*** 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Down/Lateral - -0.698 0.045** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.308 0.574 
Prior_MAO - -0.305 0.706 
Age - -0.013 0.534 
Leverage - 0.161 0.735 
Loan_Size + 0.405 0.000*** 
CFO + 1.602 0.134 
Current_Ratio + -0.018 0.766 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.604 0.050** 
Year dummies: Included 
R Square: 0.080 
Adjusted R Square: 0.063 
Dependent variable: Loan maturity 
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change in downward and lateral 
directions: 102 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 784 
Total N: 886 
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Table 13: The effect of downward & lateral audit firm changes (i.e., Big 4 
to non-Big 4, Big 4 to Big 4, and non-Big 4 to non-Big 4) on debt financing 
 Expected sign Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? 6.826 0.000*** 
Firm_Down/Lateral + 0.229 0.076* 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.080 0.702 
Partner_Change + 0.127 0.096* 
Prior_MAO + 0.231 0.600 
Age + 0.036 0.000*** 
Leverage + 1.226 0.000*** 
Loan_Size - -0.412 0.000*** 
CFO - -1.096 0.025** 
Current_Ratio - -0.003 0.853 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.286 0.026** 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.182 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.259 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
Downward & lateral audit firm changes: 784 
No change in an audit firm: 3555 
Total N: 4339 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 14: The effect of downward & lateral audit firm changes (i.e., Big 4 
to non-Big 4, Big 4 to Big 4, and non-Big 4 to non-Big 4) on loan maturity 
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? -5.731 0.000*** 
Firm_Down/Lateral - -0.354 0.013** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.307 0.199 
Partner_Change - -0.170 0.080* 
Prior_MAO - -0.256 0.575 
Age - 0.004 0.710 
Leverage - 0.063 0.797 
Loan_Size + 0.423 0.000*** 
CFO + 0.789 0.172 
Current_Ratio + -0.002 0.934 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.422 0.014** 
Year dummies: Included 
R Square: 0.093 
Adjusted R Square: 0.086 
Dependent variable: Loan maturity 
Downward & lateral audit firm changes: 437 
No change in an audit firm: 1772 
Total N: 2209 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 15: The effects of audit firm changes (Big 10) on debt financing 
 Expected sign Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? 6.867 0.000*** 
Firm_Up ? -0.482 0.043** 
Firm_Down + 0.662 0.057* 
Firm_Lateral + 0.262 0.060* 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.025 0.903 
Partner_Change + 0.134 0.081* 
Prior_MAO + 0.278 0.531 
Age + 0.036 0.000*** 
Leverage + 1.263 0.000*** 
Loan_Size - -0.415 0.000*** 
CFO - -1.045 0.033** 
Current_Ratio - -0.001 0.935 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.285 0.027** 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.184 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.263 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
Upward audit firm change: 108 
Downward audit firm change: 76 
Lateral audit firm change: 614 
No change in an audit firm: 3555 
Total N: 4353 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 16: The effects of audit firm changes (Big 10) on loan maturity 
 Expected sign Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? -5.655 0.000*** 
Firm_Up ? 0.469 0.081* 
Firm_Down - -0.723 0.039** 
Firm_Lateral - -0.498 0.001*** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.307 0.196 
Partner_Change - -0.181 0.061* 
Prior_MAO - -0.297 0.513 
Age - 0.004 0.725 
Leverage - 0.076 0.756 
Loan_Size + 0.419 0.000*** 
CFO + 0.846 0.142 
Current_Ratio + -0.004 0.860 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.424 0.014** 
Year dummies: Included 
R Square: 0.098 
Adjusted R Square: 0.091 
Dependent variable: Loan maturity 
Upward audit firm change: 78 
Downward audit firm change: 42 
Lateral audit firm change: 318 
No change in an audit firm: 1772 
Total N: 2210 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 17: The effects of audit firm changes on debt financing in a change 
form 
 Expected sign Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? -2.686 0.001*** 
Firm_Up ? -1.950 0.057* 
Firm_Down + 1.042 0.027** 
Firm_Lateral + 0.426 0.007*** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.311 0.290 
Partner_Change + 0.619 0.000*** 
Prior_MAO + 0.100 0.840 
Age + 0.002 0.888 
Leverage + 0.730 0.011** 
Loan_Size - 0.010 0.796 
CFO - -0.796 0.271 
Current_Ratio - -0.019 0.679 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.190 0.388 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.032 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.055 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
Upward audit firm change: 33 
Downward audit firm change: 20 
Lateral audit firm change: 409 
No change in an audit firm: 2122 
Total N: 2584 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 18: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm 
change on debt financing in a change form  
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient Sig. 
Constant ? -1.986 0.037** 
Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange + 0.860 0.000*** 
Man_Partner_Change ? -0.225 0.400 
Prior_MAO + 0.716 0.253 
Age  + -0.005 0.738 
Leverage + 0.657 0.017** 
Loan_Size - -0.026 0.573 
CFO - -1.405 0.086* 
Current_Ratio - -0.002 0.961 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.302 0.223 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.030 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.053 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 1195 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 927 
Total N: 2122 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 19: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm 
change on debt financing in a change form 
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient Sig. 
Constant ? -0.572 0.706 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change + 1.524 0.000*** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.638 0.246 
Prior_MAO + 0.569 0.491 
Age  + 0.007 0.801 
Leverage + 0.588 0.070* 
Loan_Size - -0.101 0.170 
CFO - 1.518 0.279 
Current_Ratio - -0.087 0.518 
Industry_Dummy ? 0.407 0.288 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.052 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.102 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 109 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 927 
Total N: 1036 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 20: The effects of audit firm changes on debt financing in a change 
form with firm fixed effect 
 Expected sign Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? -36.809 1.000 
Firm_Up ? -1.418 0.248 
Firm_Down + 3.937 0.006*** 
Firm_Lateral + 0.892 0.001*** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.604 0.182 
Partner_Change + 0.788 0.000*** 
Prior_MAO + -0.960 0.448 
Age + 4.138 1.000 
Leverage + 1.178 0.143 
Loan_Size - 0.084 0.345 
CFO - 1.827 0.149 
Current_Ratio - 0.046 0.807 
Year dummies: Included 
Firm fixed effect: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.348 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.594 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
Upward audit firm change: 33 
Downward audit firm change: 20 
Lateral audit firm change: 409 
No change in an audit firm: 2122 
Total N: 2584 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
Table 21: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm 
change on debt financing in a change form with firm fixed effect 
 Expected sign Coefficient Sig. 
Constant ? -37.618 1.000 
Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange + 1.299 0.000*** 
Man_Partner_Change ? -0.590 0.159 
Prior_MAO + -36.578 0.998 
Age  + 4.230 1.000 
Leverage + 1.127 0.154 
Loan_Size - 0.069 0.545 
CFO - 0.328 0.836 
Current_Ratio - 0.331 0.164 
Year dummies: Included 
Firm fixed effect: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.360 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.633 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 1195 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 927 
Total N: 2122 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 22: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm 
change on debt financing in a change form with firm fixed effect 
 Expected sign Coefficient Sig. 
Constant ? -19.654 1.000 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change + 4.456 0.000*** 
Man_Firm_Change ? -1.664 0.315 
Prior_MAO + -37.180 0.999 
Age  + -0.064 1.000 
Leverage + 3.473 0.402 
Loan_Size - -0.238 0.349 
CFO - 3.526 0.384 
Current_Ratio - 0.758 0.486 
Year dummies: Included 
Firm fixed effect: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.411 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.816 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 109 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 927 
Total N: 1036 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 23: The effects of audit firm changes on debt financing with SOE 
 Expected sign Coefficient  Sig. 
Constant ? 6.747 0.000*** 
Firm_Up ? -0.595 0.052* 
Firm_Down + 1.183 0.073* 
Firm_Lateral + 0.246 0.072* 
Man_Firm_Change ? -0.064 0.763 
Partner_Change + 0.129 0.093* 
Prior_MAO + 0.208 0.636 
Age + 0.039 0.000*** 
Leverage + 1.329 0.000*** 
Loan_Size - -0.407 0.000*** 
CFO - -0.954 0.052* 
Current_Ratio - -0.004 0.841 
SOE ? -0.316 0.000*** 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.324 0.012** 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.187 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.266 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
Upward audit firm change: 60 
Downward audit firm change: 26 
Lateral audit firm change: 712 
No change in an audit firm: 3555 
Total N: 4353 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 24: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm 
change on debt financing with SOE 
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient Sig. 
Constant ? 7.409 0.000*** 
Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange + 0.207 0.014** 
Man_Partner_Change ? -0.071 0.707 
Prior_MAO + 0.201 0.713 
Age  + 0.037 0.000*** 
Leverage + 1.580 0.000*** 
Loan_Size - -0.449 0.000*** 
CFO - -1.259 0.022** 
Current_Ratio - -0.003 0.899 
SOE ? -0.365 0.000*** 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.283 0.048** 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.203 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.285 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 1949 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606 
Total N: 3555 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 25: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm 
change on debt financing with SOE 
 Expected 
sign 
Coefficient Sig. 
Constant ? 7.774 0.000*** 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change + 0.516 0.073* 
Man_Firm_Change ? 0.583 0.186 
Prior_MAO + -0.150 0.812 
Age  + 0.039 0.004*** 
Leverage + 1.349 0.000*** 
Loan_Size - -0.456 0.000*** 
CFO - -1.912 0.012** 
Current_Ratio - -0.027 0.467 
SOE ? -0.367 0.005*** 
Industry_Dummy ? -0.232 0.236 
Year dummies: Included 
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.205 
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.286 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 193 
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606 
Total N: 1799 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Appendix: Definitions of all variables 
Collateral a dummy variable equal to one if bank debt 
is backed by any collaterals and zero 
otherwise 
Firm_Up a dummy variable equal to one if an audit 
firm changes from non-Big N to Big N and 
zero otherwise 
Firm_Down a dummy variable equal to one if an audit 
firm changes from Big N to non-Big N and 
zero otherwise 
Firm_Lateral a dummy variable equal to one with an 
audit firm changes from Big N to Big N and 
non-Big N to non-Big N and zero otherwise 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change a dummy variable equal to one in the 
situation that no change in audit partners, 
but an audit firm change and zero for no 
change in an audit firm and audit partners 
Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange a dummy variable equal to one in the 
situation that an audit partner change 
without an audit firm change and zero for 
no change in an audit firm and audit 
partners 
Man_Firm_Change a dummy variable equal to one if there is a 
mandatory audit firm change and zero 
otherwise 
Man_Partner_Change a dummy variable equal to one if there is a 
mandatory audit partner change and zero 
otherwise 
Partner_Change a dummy variable equal to one if there is an 
audit partner change and zero otherwise 
Firm_Change a dummy variable equal to one if there is an 
audit firm change and zero otherwise 
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Down/Lateral a dummy variable equal to one in the 
situation that no change in audit partners, 
but an audit firm change in downward and 
lateral directions and zero for no change in 
an audit firm and audit partners 
Firm_ Down/Lateral a dummy variable equal to one if an audit 
firm changes from Big N to non-Big N, Big 
N to Big N, and non-Big N to non-Big N 
and zero otherwise 
Loan_Maturity the length of the loan term 
Prior_MAO a dummy variable equal to one if the 
company received modified audit opinion 
in the previous year and zero otherwise 
Age the number of years since listed 
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Leverage total liabilities to total assets ratio 
Loan_Size a natural logarithm of the loan size 
CFO cash flows from operations scaled by total 
assets 
Current_Ratio current assets to current liabilities ratio 
SOE a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is 
a state-owned enterprise and zero otherwise 
Industry_Dummy a dummy variable equal to one if the 
company is in the manufacturing sector and 
zero otherwise 
Year dummies Year dummies from 2007-2014 
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